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THE AGENCY DEFENSE IN NARCOTICS
SALES PROSECUTIONS: A JUDICIAL
LOOPHOLE IN THE NEW YORK DRUG LAWS
INTRODUCTION
Recently criticized as an "arcane mixture of agency and penal
concepts,"' the ;'procuring agent theory" has long been recognized
as a defense in narcotics sale prosecutions. This judicially created
doctrine is based upon the premise that one who purchases contra-
band at the request of another is acting merely as an agent and
should not be held liable for unlawful sale when he delivers the
contraband to his principal. 2
Developed in the early 1900's, 3 the agency defense was widely
applied in federal and state courts until the mid-1960's.1 At that
time, many jurisdictions adopted broadly worded statutes that were
designed to curb a growing illicit narcotics industry' which had
engendered a wide variety of social ills.' In the face of clear legisla-
tive policy and, in many instances, explicit statutory language 7
most courts concluded that this common law doctrine was no longer
viable.'
Recently, however, the New York Court of Appeals reaffirmed
the vitality of the procuring agent theory in four major opinions9
which attempt to draw loosely woven guidelines for the defense's
future application. The court's reaffirmation of this common law
I People v. Roche, 45 N.Y.2d 78, 89, 379 N.E.2d 208, 215, 407 N.Y.S.2d 682, 689 (1978)
(Gabrielli, J., dissenting in part).
2 In United States v. Barcella, 432 F.2d 570 (1st Cir. 1970), the first circuit, examining
the agency defense for the first time, stated:
In essence the theory is that if the defendant, in procuring the drugs and delivering
them to the recipient, acted solely as the agent of the recipient, and in no other
capacity, then the delivery was the transfer by an agent to his principal of what
already belonged to the principal and hence did not involve a sale, barter, exchange
or gift ....
Id. at 571.
See notes 12-17 and accompanying text infra.
See notes 12-24 and accompanying text infra.
See notes 21 & 25 and accompanying text infra.
* For a discussion of crime and the addict, see J. INcIR.DI & C. CHAMBERS, DRUGS AND
THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 57-73 (1974).
See notes 23 & 26 and accompanying text infra.
See notes 24, 29-35 and accompanying text infra.
People v. Roche, 45 N.Y.2d 78, 379 N.E.2d 208, 407 N.Y.S.2d 682 (1978); People v. Lam
Lek Chong, 45 N.Y.2d 64, 379 N.E.2d 200, 407 N.Y.S.2d 674 (1978); People v. Sierra, 45
N.Y.2d 56, 379 N.E.2d 196, 407 N.Y.S.2d 669 (1978); People v. Argibay, 45 N.Y.2d 45, 379
N.E.2d 191, 407 N.Y.S.2d 664 (1978) (per curiam).
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doctrine has particular significance in light of New York's strict
drug laws, which have been characterized as the harshest and most
inflexible in the nation.'0 This Note will trace the development of
the agency defense in the federal and state courts, with particular
emphasis on the reasons for its eventual decline. The doctrine's
background in New York and the court of appeals' recent revitaliza-
tion of the agency defense will be discussed in detail. Finally, the
characteristics of the doctrine, as outlined by the court, will be
explored in an effort to predict its practical utility.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE AGENCY DEFENSE
A Judicial Response to Local Prohibition Laws
The notion that a defendant is not liable for criminal acts per-
formed by him as an agent for another was rejected early in the
development of criminal law." The courts generally have adhered
to the principle that
[t]he law does not recognize the doctrine of agency as a defense
to a criminal charge. It deals with the person who commits the
overt act, and while others may be guilty as accessories, the party
committing the prohibited act is not permitted to interpose the
defense that he acted only as an agent or employee. 2
Notwithstanding this generally accepted rule, some turn-of-the-
century courts permitted the use of an agency defense in state prose-
cutions for the sale of intoxicating liquors.'3 These early prosecu-
tions arose in the context of a patchwork of local statutes which
prohibited the manufacture, sale or transportation of intoxicating
liquors within the borders of a particular county or state.'4 Theoreti-
,o See generally THE NATION'S TOUGHEST DRUG LAW: EVALUATING THE NEW YORK EXPERI-
ENcE-FINAL REPORT OF THE JOINT Co~NIrrE. ON NEW YORK DRUG LAW EVALUATION. For a
comparison of the laws and penalties for narcotics crimes in New York and eleven other
representative states, see D. BERNHEim, DEFENSE OF NARcOTIcs CASES § 1.05, at 1-59 to -169.24
(rev. ed. 1977).
" See, e.g., People v. Richmond, 29 Cal. 415 (1866); Commonwealth v. Feeney, 95 Mass.
(13 Allen) 560 (1866).
11 State v. Chauvin, 231 Mo. 31, 32, 132 S.W. 243, 244 (1910). The Chauvin defendant
was charged with operating a poker table in an illegal gambling casino. The court expressly
rejected this defendant's contention that he should not be held culpable since he was merely
acting as an agent for his employer. Id. at 34, 132 S.W. at 245.
" See, e.g., Du Bois v. State, 87 Ala. 101, 6 So. 381 (1889); People v. Converse, 157 Mich.
29, 121 N.W. 475 (1909); Tate v. State, 91 Miss. 382, 44 So. 836 (1907); State v. Lynch, 81
Ohio St. 336, 90 N.E. 935 (1910); Reed v. State, 3 Okla. Crim. 16, 103 P. 1070 (1909); Way v.
State, 36 Tex. Crim. 40, 35 S.W. 377 (1896).
11 Statutes prohibiting the sale or manufacture of intoxicating liquors were particularly
prevalent in the southern and western states. See, e.g., Morgan v. State, 81 Ala. 72, 1 So.
472 (1887); Dale v. State, 90 Ark. 579, 120 S.W. 389 (1909); Wakemen v. Chambers, 69 Iowa
19781
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cally, an individual could be held liable under these statutes for
making an unlawful "sale" if he purchased liquor in a "wet" juris-
diction and subsequently transferred it to another party in a "dry"
territory. 5 Many courts rejected this argument, however, in cases
where the defendant purchased and delivered the liquor at the re-
quest of another and was not personally interested in the transac-
tion." In such cases, the courts generally concluded that the defen-
dant was merely an agent acting at the direction of a principal and
therefore could not be considered a seller within the meaning of the
applicable criminal statute. 7
The Federal Narcotics Cases
Almost 50 years after the agency defense was recognized in
state liquor prosecutions, the federal courts began to apply a similar
theory in cases involving the unlawful sale of narcotics. 8 Presented
169, 28 N.W. 498 (1886); State v. Cullins, 53 Kan. 100, 36 P. 56 (1894); State v. Wingfield,
115 Mo. 428, 22 S.W. 363 (1893); Redd v. State, 77 S.W. 214 (Tex. Crim. App. 1903). The
typical state statute "regulate[d] the sale, giving away, or otherwise disposing of spiritous,
vinous, or malt liquors, or intoxicating bitters, or patent medicines having alcohol as a base
." Morgan v. State, 81 Ala. 72, 73, 1 So. 472, 473 (1887) (citing ALA. CODE § 4806 (1876).
These local statutes ultimately were superseded by the enactment of the National Prohi-
bition Act, Pub. L. No. 66, ch. 85, tit. I1, § 3, 41 Stat. 305, 308 (1919), which made it illegal
to "manufacture, sell, barter, transport, import, export, deliver, furnish or possess any in-
toxicating liquors."
11 See, e.g., State v. Wingfield, 115 Mo. 428, 429, 22 S.W. 363, 364 (1893); Way v. State,
36 Tex. Crim. 40, 41, 35 S.W. 377, 378 (1896).
11 See, e.g., Du Bois v. State, 87 Ala. 101, 6 So. 381 (1889); Morgan v. State, 81 Ala. 72,
1 So. 472 (1887); State v. Cairns, 64 Kan. 782, 68 P. 621 (1902); State v. Wingfield, 115 Mo.
428, 22 S.W. 363 (1893); Redd v. State, 77 S.W. 214 (Tex. Crim. App. 1903); cf. Dale v. State,
90 Ark. 579, 120 S.W. 389 (1909) (defendant with no personal interest in contraband may not
invoke agency defense if he guaranteed purchaser's payment to seller).
1" Although the state statutes generally prohibited the sale of liquor, see note 14 and
accompanying text supra, no penalties were prescribed for the purchase or possession of the
contraband. Applying these statutes, many state courts reasoned that, since a principal could
not be held criminally liable for purchasing alcohol for personal use, an agent who acts solely
in the principal's behalf should not be held responsible. See, e.g., Campbell v. State, 79 Ala.
271 (1885); Wakemen v. Chambers, 69 Iowa 169, 28 N.W. 498 (1886). Similarly, the state
courts generally rejected the contention that a defendant was an agent or abettor of the seller
if he merely aided a friend in making a liquor purchase. See Campbell v. State, 79 Ala. 271
(1885); State v. Cullins, 53 Kan. 100, 36 P. 56 (1894).
11 See, e.g., Garcia v. United States, 373 F.2d 806 (10th Cir. 1967); United States v.
Moses, 220 F.2d 166 (3d Cir. 1955); United-States v. Sawyer, 210 F.2d 169 (3d Cir. 1954).
Cases arising before 1970 were prosecuted under the Jones-Miller Act, Pub. L. No. 221,
35 Stat. 614 (1909), and the Harrison Act, Pub. L. No. 223, 38 Stat. 785 (1914). These statutes
were revenue producing measures which did not effectively discourage drug trafficking. See
9 UNwoRm LAws ANN., commentary at 524 (master ed. West 1973). Under the Jones-Miller
Act, Pub. L. No. 221, 35 Stat. 614 (1909), the sale, possession, purchase or importation of
opium was punishable by a fine of not more than $5,000 and imprisonment for not more than
2 years. The Harrison Act, Pub. L. No. 223, 38 Stat. 785 (1914), merely imposed a tax upon
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with a prosecution against an intermediary for unlawful drug sale,
one court concluded that a defendant who procures narcotics on
behalf of another acts as an agent for the buyer and cannot be
convicted as a seller. 9 This reasoning was widely accepted in the
federal courts0 until the enactment of the Comprehensive Drug
Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 (Controlled Substances
Act)." The Act contains a broad prohibition on the distribution of
controlled substances. "2 "Distribution," as defined in the statute,
encompasses an "actual, constructive or attempted transfer of a
controlled substance, whether or not there exists an agency
relationship. "2 Interpreting the revised statutory language, the fed-
eral courts generally have concluded that the agency theory is no
longer available as a defense in narcotics prosecutions.4
manufacturers and dispensers of narcotics sold in the United States. Violations of the Harri-
son Act were punishable by a fine not exceeding $2,000 and imprisonment for not more than
5 years.
11 United States v. Sawyer, 210 F.2d 169 (3d Cir. 1954). The Sawyer court found, without
explanation, that the agency theory was applicable in narcotics sales cases. Id. at 170. One
year later, however, in United States v. Moses, 220 F.2d 166 (3d Cir. 1955), the third circuit
reasoned that the agency defense developed in the state liquor prosecutions was available in
federal narcotics sales trials. Id. at 169.
21 See, e.g., United States v. Barcella, 432 F.2d 570 (1st Cir. 1970); Garcia v. United
States, 373 F.2d 806 (10th Cir. 1967); Myers v. United States, 337 F.2d 22 (8th Cir. 1964)
(per curiam); United States v. Sizer, 292 F.2d 596 (4th Cir. 1961); Kelley v. United States,
275 F.2d 10 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (per curiam); Adams v. United States, 220 F.2d 297 (5th Cir.
1955). Although the agency theory generally was recognized in cases involving unlawful
"sales," several courts refused to apply the doctrine when the defendant was charged with
"facilitating" a narcotics transaction under the Act of Jan. 17, 1914, Pub. L. No. 46, 38 Stat.
274 (repealed 1970). See United States v. Simons, 374 F.2d 993 (7th Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
386 U.S. 1025 (1967); Lewis v. United States, 337 F.2d 541 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381
U.S. 920 (1965); Coronado v. United States, 266 F.2d 719 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S.
851 (1959). But see United States v. Prince, 264 F.2d 850 (3d Cir. 1959).
21 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-966 (1976).
2 Section 841 of the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1976), provides
in pertinent part: "Except as authorized by this subchapter, it shall be unlawful for any
person knowingly or intentionally - (1) to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess
with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense a controlled substance. . . ." Controlled
substances are classified in five schedules, organized in accordance with their potential for
abuse, acceptance for medical treatment, physical or psychological dependency, and relative
safety under supervision. Id. § 812.
n Id. § 802(8) (emphasis added). The Controlled Substances Act defines "distribution"
as the act of "delivery." Id. § 802(11). "Delivery" is in turn defined as "the actual, construc-
tive or attempted transfer of a controlled substance, whether or not there exists an agency
relationship." Id. § 803(8).
21 United States v. Snow, 537 F.2d 1166 (4th Cir. 1976); United States v. Pierce, 498 F.2d
712 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (per curiam); United States v. Redwood, 492 F.2d 216 (3d Cir. 1974) (per
curiam); United States v. Masullo, 489 F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Pruitt, 487
F.2d 1241 (8th Cir. 1973); United States v. Hernandez, 480 F.2d 1044 (9th Cir. 1973); United
States v. Workopich, 479 F.2d 1142 (5th Cir. 1973). In Pruitt, the eighth circuit held the
procuring agent theory inapplicable under the Controlled Substances Act, finding the stat-
19781
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The Rise and Fall of the Agency Defense in the State Courts
At the state level, a majority of jurisdictions adopted the Uni-
form Narcotic Drug Act (Narcotic Act),2 which defined a sale as a
"barter, exchange, or gift, or offer therefor, and each such transac-
tion made by any person, whether as principal, proprietor, agent,
servant, or employee." 6 Interpreting this provision, some state
courts found that the statute was intended to reach only those who
acted as sellers or as agents of the seller.27 Under this approach, one
who acted solely on behalf of a buyer could not be charged with
illegal sale merely because he delivered drugs to his principal.2 In
contrast, the courts in some jurisdictions interpreted identically
worded statutes as representative of a broad legislative policy in
favor of punishing all trafficking in illict drugs.29 These courts gener-
ally concluded that the judicially created agency defense was pre-
cluded by the Narcotic Act."
ute's prohibition on distribution was intended to be broader in scope than was the former
law's prohibition on purchases and sales. 487 F.2d at 1245. The Pruitt court stated that
"Congress undoubtedly intended by this new Act to make an all-out attempt to combat illicit
drugs by subjecting any individual who knowingly participates in the distribution to substan-
tial ... penalties. . . ." Id.
See 9 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 528 (master ed. West 1973).
28 Id. at 529.
E.g., State v. Osbum, 211 Kan. 248, 505 P.2d 742 (1973); People v. Turner, 38 Mich.
App. 479, 196 N.W.2d 799 (1972), modified, 390 Mich. 7, 210 N.W.2d 336 (1973); Roy v. State,
87 Nev. 517, 489 P.2d 1158 (1971); Posey v. State, 507 P.2d 576 (Okla. Crim. 1973); Common-
wealth v. Simione, 447 Pa. 473, 291 A.2d 764 (1972); Durham v. State, 162 Tex. Crim. 25,
280 S.W.2d 737 (1955).
E.g., Posey v. State, 507 P.2d 576 (Okla. Crim. 1973); Durham v. State, 162 Tex. Crim.
25, 280 S.W.2d 737 (1955).
E.g., McKay v. State, 489 P.2d 145 (Alas. 1971); State v. Russell, 108 Ariz. 549, 503
P.2d 377 (1972) (en banc); State v. Galvan, 108 Ariz. 212, 495 P.2d 442 (1972); State v.
Jacobson, 15 Ariz. App. 604, 490 P.2d 433 (1971); People v. Dinkel, 541 P.2d 898 (Colo. 1975);
Granville v. State, 287 A.2d 652 (Del. 1972); People v. Shannon, 15 Ill. 2d 494, 155 N.E.2d
578 (1959); People v. Abbott, 110 Ill. App. 2d 462, 249 N.E.2d 675 (1969); State v. Allen, 292
A.2d 167 (Me. 1972); State v. Weissman, 73 N.J. Super. 274, 179 A.2d 748 (1962); Higby v.
State, 485 P.2d 380 (Wyo. 1971). Significantly, the Dinkel court observed that, while the
agency defense might be available under statutes prohibiting only sale, it should not be
applied under a statutory scheme designed to prohibit a broader range of conduct. 541 P.2d
at 900.
Interpreting the language of the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act (Uniform Narcotic Act)
in State v. Allen, 292 A.2d 167 (Me. 1972), the court held that the term "sale" encompassed
any transfer of proscribed drugs. In this court's view, recognition of the agency defense would
frustrate the purpose of the act "by seriously hindering the enforcement process." Id. at 171.
Significantly, the Allen court distinguished the early liquor sales cases, see note 14 and
accompanying text supra, from prosecutions for narcotics sale under the Uniform Narcotic
Act. The court noted that, unlike the modem drug laws, the turn-of-the-century state prohi-
bition statutes did not punish possession of contraband. See note 14 supra. Thus, it was
reasonable for the liquor prosecution courts to assume that the legislature did not intend to
punish "agents" for conduct that would be wholly lawful if pursued by the principal. Such a
19781 AGENCY DEFENSE
Another substantial number of jurisdictions joined in the latter
position 31 when their legislatures repealed the Narcotic Act and re-
placed it with the Uniform Controlled Substances Act (Uniform
Substances Act),32 a model statute which parallels the language of
the federal narcotics law.3 Following the position adopted at the
federal level, most courts within these jurisdictions ruled that the
broader wording of the new uniform act demonstrated a legislative
intent to eliminate the agency defense.3 4 Thus, by the mid-1970's,
the procuring agent theory appeared to be headed toward extinc-
tion. 5
conclusion, in the Allen court's view, was unwarranted under a statutory scheme that prohib-
ited both sale and possession. 292 A.2d at 170-71.
31 See Fant v. State, 530 S.W.2d 364 (Ark. 1975); State v. Kelsey, 58 Haw. 234, 566 P.2d
1370 (1977); People v. Williams, 54 Mich. App. 448, 221 N.W.2d 204 (1974); Boone v. State,
291 So. 2d 182 (Miss. 1974); Tipton v. State, 528 P.2d 1115 (Okla. Crim. App. 1974); Wood
v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 97, 197 S.E.2d 200 (1973). The shift in the state courts' attitudes
toward the procuring agent theory is exemplified by the sequence of developments in Massa-
chusetts. In Commonwealth v. Harvard, 356 Mass. 452, 454, 253 N.E.2d 346, 348-49 (1969),
the Massachusetts Supreme Court held that the agency defense was not precluded by the
Uniform Narcotic Act. Two years after the Harvard decision, however, Massachusetts
adopted the Uniform Controlled Substances Act (Uniform Substances Act) which makes
distribution unlawful "whether or not there is an agency relationship." [1971] Mass. Acts
ch. 1071, at 1285 (codified at MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 94C, §§ 1, 32 (West 1972)). Although
the availability of the agency defense under the new statute remains an open question, at
least one Massachusetts court has suggested that the statutory emphasis upon "distribution"
rather than "sale" indicates a legislative intention to punish all those who traffic in drugs.
Commonwealth v. Noons, 2 Mass. App. 814, 308 N.E.2d 915 (1974).
In contrast, the Iowa Supreme Court recently has reaffirmed the vitality of the agency
defense under a version of the Uniform Substances Act which is identical to the federal
provisions. State v. Lott, 255 N.W.2d 105 (Iowa 1977); see IowA CODE ANN. § 205-101(1),(8)
(West Supp. 1978-1979); note 23 and accompanying text supra. Relying on United States v.
Moses, 220 F.2d 166 (3d Cir. 1955), see note 19 and accompanying text supra, the Lott court
concluded that "one who aids only the transferee is [not] guilty of delivery." 255 N.W.2d at
107. Similarly, in Hill v. State, 348 So. 2d 848 (Ala. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 348 So. 2d
857 (1977), an Alabama state court permitted the use of the agency defense under the Uniform
Substances Act where the accusatory instrument charged the defendant with an illegal "sale"
rather than unlawful "distribution." Id. at 855; see ALA. CODE § 20-2-7 (1975). The Hill court
reasoned that the enactment of the Uniform Substances Act in Alabama. was not intended
to alter the previously accepted definition of "sale." 348 So. 2d at 855. Thus, the court
concluded that there was no reasonable basis to impose liability in this case for "selling" if
the defendant did not act on behalf of the seller. Id.
n See 9 UNIFORM LAws ANN. 192 (master ed. West 1973). The model statute has been
adopted by more than 40 states. See id. at 145.
3 Like its federal counterpart, the Uniform Substances Act, id. at 192, prohibits distri-
bution of illicit drugs "whether or not there exists an agency relationship." Id. at 194; see
notes 18-19 and accompanying text supra. The model act was drafted by the Department of
Justice acting pursuant to its authority under the Controlled Substances Act. See 21 U.S.C.
§ 873 (1976).
u See cases cited in note 31 supra.
See generally Donnino & Girese, The Agency Defense in Drug Cases, N.Y.L.J., Apr.
27, 1978, at 24, col. 3.
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THE AGENCY DEFENSE IN NEW YORK
In New York, the agency defense was first adopted in People v.
Buster,"' a 1955 appellate division decision. Finding no evidence
that the defendant was associated with the seller in a common ven-
ture or that the defendant had received any benefit from the sale,
the court held that the defendant was merely an agent of the buyer
and thus was not guilty of a "sale" when he transferred the narcotics
to his principal. 7 The decision was followed by People v. Branch, 3
in which the appellate division stressed the fact that the defendant
had obtained no personal benefit for his role as an intermediary in
the transaction.3 Like the Buster court, the Branch court found the
agency defense applicable."
Although the procuring agent theory received widespread rec-
ognition in the lower New York courts after the Buster decision," it
was never expressly approved by the state's highest court. The issue
was first presented to the New York Court of Appeals in People v.
Lindsey." The Lindsey court merely affirmed without opinion the
appellate division's finding that the agency defense is available to
a defendant who neither profited from the transaction nor partici-
pated in a common scheme with the seller.' 3 After Lindsey, the court
of appeals had numerous opportunities to evaluate the viability of
286 App. Div. 1141, 145 N.Y.S.2d 437 (4th Dep't 1955) (per curiam).
Id. at 1141, 145 N.Y.S.2d at 438. The Buster court relied primarily on its earlier
decision in People v. Pasquarello, 282 App. Div. 405, 407, 123 N.Y.S.2d 98, 100 (4th Dep't
1953) (per curiam), affl'd, 306 N.Y. 759, 118 N.E.2d 361 (1954), wherein it was held that one
who merely purchases narcotics may not be prosecuted as an accomplice of the seller. The
Pasquarello court noted that the existing statutory scheme, see note 44 infra, reserved its
harshest penalties for the professional drug seller rather than his victim, the habitual user.
The court reasoned that the clear legislative intent to differentiate between the seller and the
user-buyer should not be circumvented by holding the buyer criminally liable as an accompl-
ice of the seller. 282 App. Div. at 408, 123 N.Y.S.2d at 100-01.
The Buster court also relied upon United States v. Moses, 220 F.2d 166 (3d Cir. 1955),
and United States v. Sawyer, 210 F.2d 169 (3d Cir. 1954), two of the early federal decisions
recognizing the agency defense in narcotics prosecutions. 286 App. Div. at 1141, 145 N.Y.S.2d
at 438; see note 21 and accompanying text supra; note 78 and accompanying text infra.
13 App. Div. 2d 714, 213 N.Y.S.2d 535 (4th Dep't 1961).
Id. at 714, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 535.
40 Id.
1 See, e.g., People v. Valentine, 55 App. Div. 2d 585, 390 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1st Dep't 1976);
People v. Munoz, 54 App. Div. 2d 844, 388 N.Y.S.2d 307 (1st Dep't 1976); People v. Bostick,
51 App. Div. 2d 749, 379 N.Y.S.2d 169 (2d Dep't 1976) (mere.); People v. Robert W., 47 App.
Div. 2d 793, 366 N.Y.S.2d 63 (3d Dep't 1975); People v. Fortes, 24 App. Div. 2d 428, 260
N.Y.S.2d 716 (1st Dep't 1965) (per curiam).
42 12 N.Y.2d 958, 189 N.E.2d 492, 238 N.Y.S.2d 956 (1963), aff'g mem. 16 App. Div. 2d
805, 228 N.Y.S.2d 427 (2d Dep't 1962).
a 12 N.Y.2d at 959, 189 N.E.2d at 492, 238 N.Y.S.2d at 957; see note 45 and accompany-
ing text infra.
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the agency defense under the existing state narcotics laws." On each
occasion, however, the court merely affirmed the decision of the
appellate division without opinion. 5 Only in People v. Cart" did the
court of appeals give any indication of its views on the procuring
agent theory. The Carr court reversed the appellate division deci-
sion 7 on the dissenting memorandum of the court below, which
would have permitted the defendant to raise the agency defense."
It was not until 1978, however, that the state's highest court
squarely addressed the issue in four major opinions" which outlined
the scope of the agency defense under New York law.
" Prior to 1967, drug offenders were prosecuted under §§ 1751 and 1752 of the penal
law. Chs. 529-30, [1951] N.Y. Laws 1293-94 (repealed 1967). The sale of any illegal drug,
ch. 529, [1951] N.Y. Laws 1293 (repealed 1967), or the possession with intent to "unlawfully
administer" a drug, ch. 530, [1951] N.Y. Laws 1294 (repealed 1967), was punishable by a
term of imprisonment of "not more than ten years." Chs. 529-30, [1951] N.Y. Laws 1293-94
(repealed 1967). The penal law was subsequently amended to account for newer drugs as they
became popular. See, e.g., Ch. 323, [1965] N.Y. Laws 1041 (repealed 1967) (depressants and
stimulants); ch. 332, [1965] N.Y. Laws 1073 (repealed 1967) (hallucinogens). In 1967, how-
ever, the legislature restructured the penal statute by establishing a general category of
"dangerous drugs" and prescribing penalties based on the quantity sold or possessed. See
N.Y. PENAL LAw art. 220, commentary at 4-5 (McKinney 1967). The degrees of criminal
possession ranged from a Class A misdemeanor, ch. 1030, [1965] N.Y. Laws 2343, 2441
(repealed 1967), to a Class C felony, id. at 2442. The lowest degree of criminal sale was a Class
D felony, id. (repealed 1973), and the highest degree was a Class B felony, id.. These danger-
ous Drug Offenses were repealed, however, when the Controlled Substances Offenses Act was
adopted. Ch. 276, [1973] N.Y. Laws 1040; see note 53 infra
"See, e.g., People v. Hingerton, 26 N.Y.2d 790, 257 N.E.2d 662, 309 N.Y.S.2d 218 (1970)
(mei.); People v. Harris, 24 N.Y.2d 810, 248 N.E.2d 444, 300 N.Y.S.2d 589 (1969) (mem.);
People v. Bray, 15 N.Y.2d 637, 204 N.E.2d 196, 255 N.Y.S.2d 862 (1964) (mem.); People v.
Wright, 15 N.Y.2d 555, 202 N.E.2d 910, 254 N.Y.S.2d 368 (1964), modified, 15 N.Y.2d 851,
205 N.E.2d 877, 257 N.Y.S.2d 958 (1965). It is interesting to note that, in each of these cases,
the court of appeals upheld the defendant's conviction despite the theoretical availability of
an agency defense.
" 41 N.Y.2d 847, 362 N.E.2d 259, 393 N.Y.S.2d 708 (1977) (mem.).
People v. Carr, 49 App. Div. 656 (3d Dep't 1975), rev'd mem., 41 N.Y.2d 847, 362
N.E.2d 259, 393 N.Y.S.2d 708 (1977). The appellate division majority in Carr affirmed the
defendant's conviction for criminal sale of a controlled substance after finding that he was
actively involved in a "drug-selling enterprise of relatively extensive proportions." 49 App.
Div. at 656. Relying on the defendant's testimony that he purchased drugs for college stu-
dents from a supplier with whom he was in close contact, the majority concluded that the
defendant was acting on behalf of the seller rather than as an agent for a buyer. Id.
- 41 N.Y.2d 847, 362 N.E.2d 259, 393 N.Y.S.2d 708 (1977), rev'g mem., 49 App. Div. 2d
656 (3d Dep't 1975). The dissent at the appellate division argued that the jury should have
been permitted to consider whether the defendant was acting as an agent of the purchasers.
Id. at 657 (Greenblott, J., dissenting). Justice Greenblott was particularly influenced by an
informant's testimony that the defendant purchased drugs at his request and by the fact that
the defendant received no personal profit from the transactions in question. Id. (Greenblott,
J., dissenting).
a See People v. Roche, 45 N.Y.2d 78, 379 N.E.2d 208, 407 N.Y.S.2d 682 (1978); People
v. Lam Lek Chong, 45 N.Y.2d 64, 379 N.E.2d 200, 407 N.Y.S.2d 674 (1978); People v. Sierra,
45 N.Y.2d 56, 379 N.E.2d 196, 407 N.Y.S.2d 669 (1978); People v. Argibay, 45 N.Y.2d 45,379
N.E.2d 191, 407 N.Y.S.2d 664 (1978) (per curiam).
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Statutory Developments
In 1972, New York State joined the growing number of jurisdic-
tions which have adopted the Uniform Substances Act.0 Embodied
in article 33 of the Public Health Law,"' the statute generally pro-
hibits the sale of certain specified drugs by unlicensed individuals.12
While violations of the Uniform Substances Act are punishable only
as misdemeanors,5 3 the statute's provisions have additional signi-
ficance in that they supply many of the governing definitions for
felony offenses contained in the narcotics sections of the New York
Penal Law. Under article 220 of the present penal law, an individual
may be convicted of criminal sale "when he knowingly and unlaw-
fully sells a controlled substance."' 4 Both the penal law and the
Uniform Substances Act define "sell" broadly to include "to sell,
exchange, give or dispose of to another, or to offer or agree to do the
same."' 5 The term unlawfully, however, is defined by reference to
the Controlled Substances Act, 5 which provides that it is "unlawful
for any person to manufacture, sell, prescribe, distribute, . . . pos-
sess, . . . or transport a controlled substance except as expressly
allowed by this [statute] .' 57 Like most other jurisdictions, New
York has adopted the language of the Uniform Substances Act
which defines "distribution" as "actual, constructive or attempted
transfer. . . whether or not there is an agency relationship.' Thus,
a literal interpretation of the interlocking statutes could lead to the
conclusion that the procuring agent theory is no longer viable under
the present statutory scheme. Nevertheless, in contrast to the ma-
jority of jurisdictions, most of New York's lower courts have as-
sumed that the agency defense remains available in narcotics sale
prosecutions despite the enactment of the Uniform Act."
Ch. 878, [1972] N.Y. Laws 3296.
88 N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW §§ 3300-3339 (McKinney 1977 & Supp. 1978-1979).
82 Article 33 of the New York Public Health Law is designed to regulate the distribution
of controlled substances to research subjects and persons named in prescriptions by persons
involved in the manufacturing or dispensing of controlled substances. The statute establishes
licensing and registration procedures as well as reporting requirements for the practitioner
who issues prescriptions. Although some provisions are made for misdemeanor penalties,
violations of article 33 generally result in license revocation or suspension. See Id. §§ 3390-
3396 (McKinney 1977); note 53 infra.
3 N.Y. Pun. HEALTH LAW §§ 3345, 3380, 3396 (McKinney 1977).
54 E.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 220.31 (McKinney Supp. 1978-1979) (emphasis added).
U Id. § 220.00(1) (McKinney Supp. 1978-1979); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 3302(32)
(McKinney 1977).
- N.Y. PENAL LAW § 220.00(2) (McKinney Supp. 1978-1979).
51 N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 3304 (McKinney 1977).
Id. § 3302(8), (12).
83 See, e.g., People v. Valentine, 55 App. Div. 2d 585, 390 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1st Dep't 1976);
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The Court of Appeals Approves the Agency Defense
In 1978, the New York Court of Appeals directly addressed the
issue for the first time and, in the face of overwhelming opinion to
the contrary, definitively approved the use of the agency defense in
four opinions handed down on the same day: People v. Roche,6'
People v. Lam Lek Chong, 1 People v. Argibay62 and People v.
Sierra.13 Noting that the statutory scheme for drug offenses was
intended to impose the harshest penalties upon the drug "pusher"
rather than his victim, the habitual user,"4 the court reaffirmed the
oft-cited principle that "[o]ne who acts solely as the agent of the
People v. Munoz, 54 App. Div. 2d 844, 388 N.Y.S.2d 307 (1st Dep't 1976); People v. Bostick,
51 App. Div. 2d 749, 379 N.Y.S.2d 169 (2d Dep't 1976) (mem.). Although this assumption
has not been explained or explored in the caselaw, it is not wholly irreconcilable with the
statutory language. The penal law provisions prohibit sale, but the otherwise broad definition
of that term does not include distribution. Thus, it may be argued that the legislature did
not intend to extend the harsh sanctions embodied in the penal law to the wide range of
conduct covered by the term distribution. Under this view, the language in the Uniform
Substances Act expressly excluding the agency defense would be inapplicable to prosecutions
for "unlawful sale" under article 220 of the penal law. Cf. Hill v. State, 348 So. 2d 848 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1977) (agency defense upheld where accusatory instrument charged defendant
with sale rather than distribution).
One commentator has observed that "considering the change in the applicable Federal
statute, the substantive body of law rejecting the defense by states which had formerly
recognized it after the adoption of the new uniform controlled substances act, it may be
concluded that the procuring agent defense is heading towards extinction in national Ameri-
can law." Donnino & Girese, The Agency Defense in Drug Cases, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 27, 1978, at
24, col. 3. Nevertheless, it should be noted that, in contrast to many other jurisdictions that
have adopted the Uniform Substances Act, New York has retained a dual statutory system
for regulating illicit narcotics traffic. Under the federal statutory scheme, as well as that of
many states, all prohibitions and penalties relating to the illegal drug trade are collected in
a single uniform act. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-966 (1976); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 561/2, §§ 1100-1603
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978); KAN. Rxv. STAT. §§ 218A.010-.990 (1977 & Supp. 1978). In New
York, however, the effect of the uniform act has been confined to the establishment of
minimal penalties for unlicensed distribution, see note 52 supra, while the more serious
penalties for unlicensed narcotics trading are contained in a separate article of the penal law
entitled "Controlled Substances Offenses." N.Y. PENAL LAW art. 220 (McKinney Supp. 1977-
1978). Thus, it may be argued that the legislature intended to maintain a distinct body of
criminal offenses and penalties exclusive of the uniform act's provisions. Such a legislative
purpose would appear to provide a logical basis for distinguishing narcotics sale cases arising
in New York from those arising in other jurisdictions which have rejected the agency defense
under the language of the Uniform Act.
- 45 N.Y.2d 78, 379 N.E.2d 208, 407 N.Y.S.2d 682 (1978).
81 45 N.Y.2d 64, 379 N.E.2d 200, 407 N.Y.S.2d 674 (1978).
62 45 N.Y.2d 45, 379 N.E.2d 191, 407 N.Y.S.2d 664 (1978) (per curiam).
- 45 N.Y.2d 56, 379 N.E.2d 196, 407 N.Y.S.2d 669 (1978).
01 45 N.Y.2d 78, 379 N.E.2d 208, 407 N.Y.S.2d 682 (1978). Observing that the legislature
has never explicitly acted to overrule the judicially created agency defense, the court of
appeals in Roche reasoned that this legislative silence "represents a calculated and ameliora-
tive judgment not to impose such penalties upon a person who merely facilitates the acquisi-
tion of drugs by a purchaser." Id. at 84, 379 N.E.2d at 212, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 686.
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buyer cannot be convicted of the crime of selling narcotics. 6 5 In
addition, the court used the occasion to provide loosely drawn
guidelines for future applications of the procuring agent theory. The
four opinions which articulate these general principles will be exam-
ined individually in order to illustrate the application of the agency
defense under New York law.
In People v. Roche,"6 the defendant was indicted for criminal
sale of a controlled substance in the first degree and criminal posses-
sion of a controlled substance in the first degree. 7 The charges
stemmed from a drug transaction with an undercover police officer
who met the defendant at a bar and asked him to aid in the pur-
chase of narcotics."' Although the defendant agreed to facilitate the
purchase, the transaction was not effected immediately. 9 Upon the
officer's repeated requests, the defendant finally agreed to lead him
to a drug supplier.7" Acting as an intermediary, Roche took a prees-
tablished sum of money from the officer, handed it to a drug dealer
who was waiting inside a discotheque, and returned with a package
containing heroin.7 On appeal of Roche's conviction for the sale of
a controlled substance," the court of appeals held that the question
of agency should have been submitted to the jury since there was a
reasonable basis for believing that the defendant had acted merely
as an agent of the buyer.7 3
11 People v. Branch, 13 App. Div. 2d 714, 714, 213 N.Y.S.2d 535, 535 (4th Dep't 1961)
(mem.).
" 45 N.Y.2d 78, 379 N.E.2d 208, 407 N.Y.S.2d 682 (1978).
See N.Y. PENAL LAw §§ 200.21, 220.43 (McKinney Supp. 1977-1978).
" 45 N.Y.2d at 81, 379 N.E.2d at 210, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 684; see note 124 infra.
, 45 N.Y.2d at 81, 379 N.E.2d at 210, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 684. After the initial meeting in
the bar, the undercover officer made several unsuccessful attempts to enlist Roche's aid in
making an unlawful purchase. Finally, he located Roche and informed him of his interest in
buying an "eighth," or approximately 4 ounces of cocaine or heroin. At that point, Roche
merely estimated the cost of such a purchase. It was not until almost 2 months later that the
officer recontacted the defendant and convinced him to complete the deal. Id.
7o Id.
It Id. at 81-82, 379 N.E.2d at 210, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 684. At trial, the police officer testified
that he had witnessed an exchange between the defendant and the third-party supplier.
" Id. at 82, 379 N.E.2d at 210, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 685. The trial court in Roche denied the
defendant's request for an instruction on the procuring agent theory and the defendant
subsequently was convicted for sale and possession. The sale conviction was reversed by the
appellate division. 58 App. Div. 2d 783, 785, 396 N.Y.S.2d 367, 368 (1st Dep't 1977) (mem.).
Both the defendant and the prosecution appealed the appellate division's ruling. 45 N.Y.2d
at 82, 379 N.E.2d at 211, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 685.
45 N.Y.2d at 86-87, 379 N.E.2d at 213-14, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 687-88. In a strongly-worded
dissent, Judge Gabrielli argued that the majority's approval of the agency defense represented
a misinterpretation of the legislative intent underlying New York's narcotics laws. Id. at 90,
379 N.E.2d at 215-16, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 690. Noting that the legislature distinguished between
a seller and a possessor, Judge Gabrielli concluded that the statute was designed only to
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In support of this conclusion, the court of appeals observed
that, while the New York statutes provide penalties for the sale or
possession of drugs, they do not impose criminal sanctions for the
mere purchase of narcotics.7' In light of this statutory scheme, the
Roche court reasoned, an agent should not be held to a greater
degree of culpability than is the buyer from whom he derives culpa-
ble status.75 In addition, the court pointed out that not all narcotics
buyers are motivated by criminal disposition; many are either vic-
tims of "pushers" or "good Samaritans" attempting to help such
victims.7 8 Thus, the court concluded that the traditional agency
defense properly could be considered a "common-law attempt...
to recognize the existence of medical and sociological aspects which
complicate the factual setting within which the nature of a particu-
lar defendant's participation is to be determined."7 7 Acknowledging
the limitations inherent in utilizing a commercial-law concept in
criminal prosecutions, the Roche court nevertheless concluded that
the application of the principles of agency would afford the trier of
fact the necessary flexibility in considering the often complex fac-
tual circumstances which surround drug transactions.7
After having articulated its approval of the agency defense, the
Roche court went on to enumerate some of the factors to be consid-
ered in determining when the doctrine should be applied.7 One
important consideration is whether the defendant had a "direct
interest" in the narcotics sale. 0 If the defendant owned the drugs
or in any way acted on behalf of the seller, he may not be permitted
mitigate the punishment of the ultimate user while meting out severe penalties for those "who
contribute in some way to the distribution of illicit drugs." Id., 379 N.E.2d at 216, 407
N.Y.S.2d at 690. Thus, the dissent concluded that one who transfers drugs in the capacity of
an agent is in reality a distributor whom the legislature intended to be punished harshly. Id.
' Id. at 82-83, 379 N.E.2d at 211, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 685.
" Id. at 83, 379 N.E.2d at 211, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 685.
"Id., 379 N.E.2d at 211, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 685-86; see, e.g., United States v. Sawyer, 210
F.2d 169 (3d Cir. 1954). The facts in Sawyer, which was one of the seminal federal decisions
approving the agency defense, see note 19 and accompanying text supra, represent a clear
example of a buyer who acted out of altruistic rather than criminal motives. The defendant
in that case was induced to purchase a small amount of heroin for an undercover officer after
the officer had feigned a violent seizure and claimed that he needed the drug. Although the
defendant initially refused to help the officer, he eventually succumbed to the officer's per-
sistent pleas. 210 F.2d at 170.
45 N.Y.2d at 83-84, 379 N.E.2d at 211, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 686.
78 Id. at 83, 379 N.E.2d at 211, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 685.
7 Id. at 84-85, 379 N.E.2d at 212, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 686-87. For a discussion of some of
the factors which traditionally have been found to be relevant in procuring agent cases, see
D. BERNHEIM, DEFENSE OF NARcoTIcs CASES § 1.22 (1976 Supp. 1977). See generally 3 S.
BERNSTEIN, CRIMINAL DEFENSE TECHNIQUES § 57.05[3][6] (1973 & Supp. 1977).
- 45 N.Y.2d at 85, 379 N.E.2d at 212, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 686.
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to invoke the agency defense.' "Salesman-like behavior," such as
"touting the quality" or arguing about price,8 as well as the individ-
ual's familiarity with the sellers or narcotics in general,' is some
evidence that his role in the transaction was more substantial than
that of a mere agent.85 The court stated, however, that a bare finding
that the defendant obtained or expected to obtain some personal
benefit should not in itself be sufficient to eliminate the agency
defense as a matter of law.8 ' Moreover, in the court's view, the
8, Id. (citing People v. Lan Lek Chong, 45 N.Y.2d 64, 76, 379 N.E.2d 200, 207-08, 407
N.Y.S.2d 674, 681-82 (1978); People v. Argibay, 45 N.Y.2d 45, 53, 379 N.E.2d 191, 195, 407
N.Y.S.2d 664, 668 (1978) (per curiam)).
12 45 N.Y.2d at 85, 379 N.E.2d at 212, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 686 (citing United States v. Smith,
452 F.2d 404 (8th Cir. 1971) (per curiam); United States v. Johnson, 371 F.2d 800, 806-07 (3d
Cir. 1970)).
The Smith court rejected the procuring agent defense where the defendant boasted to a
government agent that, given a few days notice, he could obtain any amount of amphetam-
ines. 452 F.2d at 406. Similarly, in Johnson, a defendant who emphasized the quality of the
drugs in an attempt to get a higher price was precluded from invoking the agency defense.
371 F.2d at 806-07.
45 N.Y.2d at 85, 379 N.E.2d at 212, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 687 (citing United States v.
Winfield, 341 F.2d 70, 71 (2d Cir. 1965); People v. Harris, 24 N.Y.2d 810, 248 N.E.2d 444,
300 N.Y.S.2d 589 (1969) (mem.)). In Winfield, the defendant assured the buyer that he had
been doing business with the supplier for a substantial time in order to allay the buyer's fears
concerning the transaction. 341 F.2d at 71. The Winfield court concluded that this evidence
of prior dealing with the seller supported a finding that the defendant was not acting on behalf
of the purchaser. Id. at 71-72.
" 45 N.Y.2d at 85, 379 N.E.2d at 212-13, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 687 (citing People v. Jenkins,
41 N.Y.2d 307, 312, 360 N.E.2d 1288, 1291, 392 N.Y.S.2d 587, 590 (1977); People v. Bucher,
30 N.Y.2d 708, 283 N.E.2d 621, 332 N.Y.S.2d 647 (1972) (mem.); People v. Hingerton, 26
N.Y.2d 790, 257 N.E.2d 662, 309 N.Y.S.2d 218 (1970) (mem.)).
45 N.Y.2d at 85, 379 N.E.2d at 212, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 686-87.
'" Id., 379 N.E.2d at 213, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 687 (citing People v. Valentine, 55 App. Div.
2d 585, 390 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1st Dep't 1976) (mem.); People v. Bostick, 51 App. Div. 2d 749, 379
N.Y.S.2d 169 (2d Dep't 1976) (mem.); People v. Johnston, 47 App. Div. 2d 897, 366 N.Y.S.2d
198 (2d Dep't 1975); Peoples v. Fortes, 24 App. Div. 2d 428, 260 N.Y.S.2d 716 (lst Dep't
1965)). Initially, the New York courts rejected attempts to invoke the agency defense when
there was any evidence that the defendant received or expected to receive some compensa-
tion for his role in the transaction. See, e.g., People v. Bray, 15 N.Y.2d 637, 204 N.E.2d 196,
255 N.Y.S.2d 862, affg mem. 21 App. Div. 2d 696, 251 N.Y.S.2d 930 (2d Dep't 1964) (mem.).
The Bray court concluded that the defendant had not acted as an agent of the buyer since
she demanded either money or "half a bag" as payment for arranging the purchase. 15
N.Y.2d at 638, 204 N.E.2d at 198, 255 N.Y.S.2d at 864. As the agency defense evolved in the
appellate division, however, the importance of the benefit received by the defendant dimin-
ished. In People v. Fortes, 24 App. Div. 2d 428, 429, 260 N.Y.S.2d 716, 717 (1st Dep't 1965),
the court found the agency defense applicable although a "$5 gratuity" was paid to the de-
fendant by the purchaser. Since Fortes, the lower courts consistently have held that the de-
fense is not precluded as a matter of law merely because the defendant gained some personal
or financial benefits. See, e.g., People v. Valentine, 55 App. Div. 2d 585, 390 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1st
Dep't 1976) (mem.) ($200 payment was only one factor in determining whether defendant was
agent of buyer); People v. Bostick, 51 App. Div. 2d 749, 379 N.Y.S.2d 169 (2d Dep't 1976)
(mem.) (defendant who received $100 entitled to use agency defense). This position was not
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defendant's apparent familiarity with illicit drugs should not alone
result in a finding that the defense is not available." In fact, the
Roche court noted that an individual who is conversant with the
local narcotics market would be the most likely target for a would-
be drug purchaser."
Applying these criteria to the facts in Roche, the court empha-
sized that the defendant had acted only upon the undercover offi-
cer's persistent prodding.89 Also significant was that Roche was ini-
tially unable to quote a specific price" and that a third party had
been observed delivering the drugs to the defendant." Moreover,
there was no evidence to show that Roche in any way benefited
personally as a result of the transaction. 2 Thus, the court con-
cluded, the defendant in Roche should have been permitted to raise
the procuring agent theory as a defense.
In contrast to the emphasis in Roche upon the flexibility of the
procuring agent theory, the court of appeals in People v. Lam Lek
Chong" stressed that there are some circumstances in which an
agency charge will be precluded as a matter of law. The defendant
in Lam Lek Chong was convicted for criminal sale of 1 1/2 pounds
of heroin to two police officers posing as narcotics dealers." Al-
expressly approved by the court of appeals, however, until its decision in Roche. See 45
N.Y.2d at 85, 379 N.E.2d at 213, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 687. In a compansion case, People v. Lam
Lek Chong, 45 N.Y.2d 64, 379 N.E.2d 200, 407 N.Y.S.2d 674 (1978), the court elaborated its
view on the issue, noting that purchasers often reward the agent by giving him money or some
of the drugs "as a token of friendship or appreciation." Id. at 75, 379 N.E.2d at 207, 407
N.Y.S.2d at 681. The court concluded, therefore, that "receipt of some incidental benefit,
does not necessarily or even ordinarily alter the relationship between the parties, the nature
of the transaction or the defendant's culpability." Id.
" 45 N.Y.2d at 87, 379 N.E.2d at 214, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 688.
'Id.
Id. at 86, 379 N.E.2d at 213, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 687.
Id.; see note 82 supra. It was not until Roche spoke with his "connection" that he was
able to inform the officer of the precise cost of the drugs. 45 N.Y.2d at 86, 379 N.E.2d at 213,
407 N.Y.S.2d at 687. Moreover, when the buyer later complained about the quality of the
merchandise he received, the defendant made no attempt to explain or remedy the situation.
Id., 379 N.E.2d at 214, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 688.
, 45 N.Y.2d at 86, 379 N.E.2d at 213, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 688.
92 Id., 379 N.E.2d at 213, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 687-88; see note 86 supra.
45 N.Y.2d 64, 379 N.E.2d 200, 407 N.Y.S.2d 674 (1978).
" Id. at 68, 379 N.E.2d at 202, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 676. The undercover officers in Lam Lek
Chang approached the defendant at his travel agency in January 1974 and told him that they
were narcotics dealers interested in purchasing heroin. The defendant initially suggested that
the drugs could be smuggled from Hong Kong. When the officers indicated that they wanted
to make an immediate purchase, however, the defendant introduced them to a dealer who
sold them $42,000 worth of heroin. In subsequent conversations with the officers, the defen-
dant intermediary assumed the role of a collector, reminding the buyers that they had not
yet paid the dealer the full price. The officers eventually gave the additional money to the
defendant who apparently turned it over to the dealer, retaining $1,000 for himself. When
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though the defendant testified that he had acted merely as the
buyer's agent,95 the other evidence indicated that he had assumed
an initiating role in the elaborately planned transaction." At trial,
the jury was instructed that if the defendant "received any 'benefit,
however slight, from having participated in the transaction, he
would not be an agent.'-"7
On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the defendant's con-
viction." The court concluded that, although the trial court erred
in its instruction, a reversal was not warranted, since the record did
not demonstrate that the defendant was entitled to an agency
charge." In reaching this result, the court distinguished cases where
the defendant transfers a small amount of drugs "solely to accomo-
date a friend" from cases such as Lam Lek Chong, which involved
a large-scale, purely commercial transaction.110 Noting that such
transactions represent precisely the type of narcotics "trafficking"
that the legislature sought to curb,101 the court reasoned that the
Lam Lek Chong case was one in which the penal statutes should be
applied "literally. 11 2 Thus, the court of appeals concluded that, as
a matter of law, the defendant was not an "agent" as that term has
been interpreted by the New York courts. 1"3
As it did in the Lam Lek Chong opinion, the court of appeals
used the facts in People v. Argibay0 4 to clarify and narrow the
procuring agent theory outlined in Roche. The Argibay defendant
this transaction was completed, the defendant told the officers that he could help them
smuggle more heroin from Hong Kong. The Hong Kong transaction collapsed after elaborate
preparations, but the relationship between the defendant and the undercover officers contin-
ued and a new deal ultimately was arranged. The officers finally arrested the defendant when
he took them to the supplier's apartment for delivery of the second 1/2 pounds of heroin. Id.
at 69-71, 379 N.E.2d at 203-04, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 676-78.
" The defendant contended that he was not financially interested in the drug transaction
but hoped that the officers would aid him in a legitimate business endeavor if he cooperated
in procuring the heroin. Id. at 72, 379 N.E.2d at 205, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 678.
" Id. at 69-71, 379 N.E.2d at 203-04, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 678.
" Id. at 68, 379 N.E.2d at 202, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 676; see note 88 supra.
" 45 N.Y.2d at 75, 379 N.E.2d at 207, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 681-82.
Id. at 75-76, 379 N.E.2d at 207, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 681.
1 Id. at 76, 379 N.E.2d at 207, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 681. Significantly, the Lam Lek Chong
court assumed that "[tihe transaction in fact was completely commercial since the buyers
themselves obviously did not intend to consume one and a half pounds of heroin." Id. Moreo-
ver, the court observed, the defendant was aware that the buyers were drug dealers. Id.
0I Although the penal law generally differentiates between possessors and sellers, see
note 148 infra, the court pointed out that the same penalties are imposed on possessors and
sellers of large quantities of drugs. 45 N.Y.2d at 73, 379 N.E.2d at 205, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 679.
0 45 N.Y.2d at 76, 379 N.E.2d at 208, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 682.
" Id., 379 N.E.2d at 207, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 681.
"' 45 N.Y.2d 45, 379 N.E.2d 191, 407 N.Y.S.2d 664 (1978) (per curiam).
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was convicted of selling cocaine to two undercover officers.'05 The
testimony at trial indicated that the officers initially were contacted
by a third party who offered to arrange the transaction.' 08 The offi-
cers agreed and were subsequently taken to the defendant Argibay's
apartment, where they waited until the "supplier" arrived with the
cocaine. ' 7 After the "supplier" departed, the drugs and money were
exchanged and the third party was compensated by both the buyers
and the defendant.'
The trial court's denial of the defendant's request for an agency
charge was affirmed by the appellate division and the defendant
appealed.'0" Reviewing the facts, the court of appeals found that the
defendant was actually a "middleman" or broker aiming to satisfy
both the seller and buyer and ultimately acting for his own bene-
fit."0 In contrast to the third party, whose loyalty rested solely with
the buyers, Argibay was apparently an independent merchant con-
cerned primarily with furthering the interests of his business.," Sig-
nificantly, the court drew a limited analogy to commercial agency
theories and concluded that "[tlo be an agent of his buyer, a nar-
cotics merchant must be a mere extension of the buyer ...
[without] any independent desire or inclination to promote the
transaction.""' Absent these circumstances, in the court's view, a
defendant is not entitled to use the procuring agent theory as a
defense to a charge of criminal narcotics sale."3
I" Id. at 50, 379 N.E.2d at 192, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 666.
, Id. at 51, 379 N.E.2d at 193, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 666.
', Id., 379 N.E.2d at 193, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 666-67. The police officers did not actually
see the "supplier" since they were asked to wait in the kitchen until he left. Id., 379 N.E.2d
at 193, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 667; see note 91 supra.
IN 45 N.Y.2d at 51-52, 379 N.E.2d at 193, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 666-67. The undercover
officers' subsequent attempts to purchase additional quantities of drugs directly from Argibay
were unsuccessful. At one point, they were told by the defendant that he preferred to transact
business through the third party. On another occasion, Argibay indicated that he "was not
making enough money to warrant his continued involvement in the narcotics trade." Id. at
51-52, 379 N.E.2d at 193, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 667.
IN Id. at 52, 379 N.E.2d at 194, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 667.
' Id. at 53, 379 N.E.2d at 194, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 668. The Argibay court stated:
All agents are, concededly, middlemen of sorts. But the converse is not true.
A middleman who acts as a broker between a seller and buyer, aiming to satisfy
both, but largely for his own benefit, cannot properly be termed an agent of either.
Such a middleman is a trader in narcotics, a merchant. He may not be concerned
with the particular needs of an individual drug purchaser except to the extent that
satisfying those needs affects his illicit business. To call him an agent strains
beyond recognition the agency concept.
Id.
II Id.
112 Id. at 53-54, 379 N.E.2d at 195, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 668.
1" Id. at 54-55, 379 N.E.2d at 195, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 668-69.
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In People v. Sierra,"4 the court of appeals reaffirmed the well-
established principle that the agency doctrine is not a defense to a
charge of possession of narcotics."' The evidence in Sierra showed
that, at the request of an undercover police officer, the defendant
procured approximately one-eighth of an ounce of cocaine, which
she subsequently delivered to him at a bar. Upon delivery, the de-
fendant received $175 to reimburse her for the cost of the drugs and
$20 for her role in the transaction."' She was immediately arrested
and charged with criminal sale of a controlled substance in the
second degree and criminal possession of a controlled substance in
the fifth degree." '7 Although the trial court permitted the defendant
to use the procuring agency theory as a defense to the "sale" charge,
it refused to give the jury an agency instruction on the possession
count."8 On appeal of the defendant's conviction for possession, the
court of appeals approved the trial court's ruling."9 Reviewing the
history of the agency defense, the Sierra court noted that it was
based on the premise that the defendant "is merely transferring to
11 45 N.Y.2d 56, 379 N.E.2d 196, 407 N.Y.S.2d 669 (1978).
,,5 Id. at 58, 379 N.E.2d at 197, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 670. The agency defense repeatedly has
been found inapplicable in cases involving possession charges. See, e.g., People v. Sheldon
K., 26 N.Y.2d 949, 258 N.E.2d 921, 310 N.Y.S.2d 507 (1970) (mem.); People v. Garcia, 50
App. Div. 2d 730, 375 N.Y.S.2d 1022 (1st Dep't 1975) (mem.); People v. O'Keefe, 87 Misc.
2d 739, 386 N.Y.S.2d 934 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1976). In Sheldon K., the court of
appeals implicitly rejected the defendant's contention that he could not be convicted of the
crime of simple possession absent a showing that he held the contraband for his own purposes
rather than as an agent for the undercover officer who induced him to deliver it. 26 N.Y.2d
at 950, 258 N.E.2d at 921, 310 N.Y.S.2d at 508.
,, 45 N.Y.2d at 59, 379 N.E.2d at 197-98, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 671.
Id., 379 N.E.2d at 197, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 671; see N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 220.09, .41
(McKinney Supp. 1977-1978). A third charge, criminal possession in the third degree, was
dropped during the trial. 45 N.Y.2d at 59, 379 N.E.2d at 198, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 671.
, 45 N.Y.2d at 59, 379 N.E.2d at 198, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 671.
"' Id. at 63, 379 N.E.2d at 200, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 674. The Sierra court also rejected the
defendant's contention that N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 3305(1)(c) (McKinney 1977) insulated
her from criminal liability for possession of narcotics. Section 3305 provides that the Con-
trolled Substances Act does not apply to "temporary incidental possession by employees or
agents of persons lawfully entitled to possession, or by persons whose possession for the
purpose of aiding public officers in performing their official duties." Id. Relying on the
language of this provision, the defendant argued that her possession was lawful because she
was acting as agent for a "person lawfully entitled to possession" or "aiding [a] public officer
in performing [his] official duty." 45 N.Y.2d at 62, 379 N.E.2d at 199-200, 407 N.Y.S.2d at
673. In response to this argument, the Sierra court stated:
The flaw in defendant's argument is the obvious fact that she had no knowledge or
information that Guerzon was a police officer and therefore could not consent to
act as an agent or employee of such an officer. . . . Since she did not know of his
status nor the nature of his activity, neither could her possession have been accom-
plished 'for the purpose of aiding' a public officer in the performance of his official
duties.
Id. (citations omitted).
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the recipient that which the recipient already owns or that to which
he is entitled."'' 0 Since the concept of ownership is not directly
relevant to a charge of criminal possession, the agency defense was
found to be inapplicable.'
SOME PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE AGENCY DEFENSE CASES
The Buyer's Agent: A Profile
Although the court of appeals was reluctant to draw overly rigid
boundaries for the newly articulated procuring agent defense, it is
possible to discern some of the doctrine's specific characteristics.
The typical procuring agent will be an individual who is somewhat
familiar with the narcotics underworld,' 2 but who does not traffic
regularly in illicit drugs. ' 1 Ordinarily he will not be the initiator of
the transaction; 4 rather, his participation generally will have been
' 45 N.Y.2d at 61, 379 N.E.2d at 198-99, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 672.
Id. at 60, 379 N.E.2d at 198, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 672. "[S]ince guilt may be established
regardless of whether [the contraband] belongs to someone else," the Sierra court reasoned
that a possessor may be convicted even if he were merely holding the drugs in his capacity
as agent for the true buyer. Id. at 61, 379 N.E.2d at 199, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 672. This conclusion
is supported by the existence of N.Y. Pus. HEALTH LAW § 3305(c) (McKinney 1977), which
provides an exemption from criminal liability for certain individuals who possess narcotics
as agents for law enforcement officers. As noted by the Sierra court, this statute would be an
unnecessary protection if the procuring agent theory were available as a defense to a charge
of narcotics possession. 45 N.Y.2d at 62, 379 N.E.2d at 200, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 673.
The Sierra court suggested in dictum, however, that the theory may be available when
the possession charge involves an additional element such as intent to sell. Id. at 59, 379
N.E.2d at 197, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 671; see, e.g., People v. Perez, 60 App. Div. 2d 656, 400
N.Y.S.2d 559 (2d Dep't 1977); People v. Garcia, 50 App. Div. 2d 730, 375 N.Y.S.2d 1022 (1st
Dep't 1975) (mem.); People v. Johnston, 47 App. Div. 2d 897, 366 N.Y.S.2d 198 (2d Dep't
1975). In Perez, the defendant was charged with criminal sale in the third degree, criminal
possession in the seventh degree and criminal possession with intent to sell. 60 App. Div. 2d
at 656, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 560. At trial, the defendant invoked the agency defense and the jury
found him not guilty of the criminal sale, but guilty on both possession counts. Id. On appeal,
the appellate division reversed the conviction for criminal possession with intent to sell,
reasoning that the only way the jury could have found the defendant not guilty of a sale was
by finding that the defendant acted as the buyer's agent. Under these circumstances, the
Perez court concluded, it was improper for the jury to infer that the defendant possessed the
narcotics with criminal intent to sell. Id.
11 In Roche, the court pointed out that the defendant "was no stranger to drugs, to their
prices and to persons involved in their traffic." 45 N.Y.2d at 87, 379 N.E.2d at 214, 407
N.Y.S.2d at 688. Nevertheless, this familiarity was not conclusive evidence that Roche was
not an agent. Id. See also People v. Munoz, 54 App. Div. 2d 844, 388 N.Y.S.2d 307 (1st Dep't
1976) (mem.).
in See, e.g., People v. Argibay, 45 N.Y.2d 45, 53, 379 N.E.2d 191, 194, 407 N.Y.S.2d 664,
668 (1978) (per curiam).
121 See, e.g., People v. Roche, 45 N.Y.2d 78, 379 N.E.2d 208, 407 N.Y.S.2d 682 (1978);
People v. Lindsey, 12 N.Y.2d 958, 189 N.E.2d 492, 238 N.Y.S.2d 956 (1963) (mei.); People
v. Melendez, 57 App. Div. 2d 522, 393 N.Y.S.2d 567 (1st Dep't 1977) (mem.); People v.
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solicited by the actual buyer."5 He may receive some gratuity for his
role in the transaction, but he will not have been motivated primar-
ily by the hope of personal gain."' In the usual case, the procuring
agent will be acting on behalf of a party who has requested the drugs
for personal use."21 Thus, while the size of the transaction is not
determinative, a transfer of large quantities of narcotics will be a
strong indication that the "middleman" was acting as a broker for
a professional drug "dealer" rather than merely accomodating the
buyer."2 Similarly, the visibility of a third-party seller may be help-
ful in demonstrating that the intermediary was not a principal in
the transaction.2 9
Valentine, 55 App. Div. 2d 585, 390 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1st Dep't 1976) (mem.); People v. Bostick,
51 App. Div. 2d 749, 379 N.Y.S.2d 169 (2d Dep't 1976) (mem.); People v. Silverman, 23 App.
Div. 2d 947, 260 N.Y.S.2d 43 (3d Dep't 1965) (mem.).
" See, e.g., People v. Roche, 45 N.Y.2d 78, 379 N.E.2d 208, 407 N.Y.S.2d 682 (1978);
People v. Lindsey, 12 N.Y.2d 958, 189 N.E.2d 492, 238 N.Y.S.2d 956 (1963) (mem.); People
v. Melendez, 57 App. Div. 2d 522, 393 N.Y.S.2d 567 (1st Dep't 1977) (mem.); People v.
Valentine, 55 App. Div. 2d 585, 390 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1st Dep't 1976); People v. Bostick, 51 App.
Div. 2d 749, 379 N.Y.S.2d 169 (2d Dep't 1976); People v. Fortes, 24 App. Div. 2d 428, 260
N.Y.S.2d 716 (1st Dep't 1965), appeal dismissed mem., 17 N.Y.2d 583, 215 N.E.2d 519, 268
N.Y.S.2d 341 (1966); People v. Silverman, 23 App. Div. 2d 947, 260 N.Y.S.2d 43 (3d Dep't
1965).
2 See note 86 and accompanying text supra.
" See, e.g., People v. Roche, 45 N.Y.2d 78, 379 N.E.2d 208, 407 N.Y.S.2d 682 (1978);
People v. Fortes, 24 App. Div. 2d 428, 260 N.Y.S.2d 716 (lst Dep't 1965), appeal dismissed
mem., 17 N.Y.2d 583, 215 N.E.2d 519, 268 N.Y.S.2d 341 (1966); People v. Branch, 13 App.
Div. 2d 714, 213 N.Y.S.2d 535 (4th Dep't 1961). In theory, the availability of the agency
defense should not turn on whether the buyer intended to use the drugs himself or resell them.
As a practical matter, however, the courts may have to resort to this factor to determine
whether the defendant was a "broker" rather than a mere agent in a particular drug transac-
tion.
,n See, e.g., People v. Lam Lek Chong, 45 N.Y.2d 64, 379 N.E.2d 200, 407 N.Y.S.2d 674
(1978); People v. Broadie, 37 N.Y.2d 100, 113, 332 N.E.2d 338, 343, 371 N.Y.S.2d 471, 478,
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 950 (1975); People v. Singleton, 50 App. Div. 2d 938, 377 N.Y.S.2d 198
(2d Dep't 1975).
"I The presence of an identifiable or visible third-party seller may be helpful in persuad-
ing the court that a particular defendant was acting as an agent of the buyer rather than as
a seller. In People v. Jenkins, 62 App. Div. 2d 1042, 405 N.Y.S.2d 1012 (2d Dep't 1978)
(mem.), for example, the defendant engaged in two separate drug transactions. In the trans-
action that involved a visible third party, the court found the defendant to be an agent of
the buyer. In the other transaction, however, the money was paid directly to the defendant
with no apparent third party present, and the conviction was upheld. Id. at 1043, 405
N.Y.S.2d at 1012. In People v. Fuller, 34 App. Div. 2d 852, 310 N.Y.S.2d 535 (3d Dep't 1970),
the court found the agency defense inapplicable to facts strikingly similar to those in Roche.
In Fuller, the defendant was approached by an investigator claiming to be interested in
purchasing drugs. After stating that he was not a dealer, the defendant agreed to lead the
buyer to someone who had a supply of narcotics. The investigator, however, was not present
when the defendant obtained the drugs. Id. In this case, the court's decision to disallow the
agency defense and affirm the defendant's conviction appears to have been influenced by the
absence of a visible third-party seller. Similarly, in People v. Robert W., 47 App. Div. 2d 793,
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If most or all of these characteristics are present, the defendant
in a narcotics prosecution probably will be entitled to have the jury
consider whether he acted merely as a procuring agent for the
buyer. 13 On the other hand, if few or none of these criteria are met,
the court may find that the agency doctrine is not applicable as a
matter of law. 31
The Procuring Agent Theory as a Defense to Criminal Facilitation
Charges
Under section 115 of the New York Penal Law, a defendant may
be convicted of criminal facilitation when "believing it probable
that he is rendering aid to a person who intends to commit a crime,
he engages in conduct which provides such person with means or
opportunity for the commission thereof."' 32 Applying a literal read-
ing of this statute, it might be possible to conclude that a party who
purchases narcotics on behalf of another is criminally liable for
facilitating a felonious sale. 13 Nevertheless, utilizing reasoning sim-
366 N.Y.S.2d 63 (3d Dep't 1975), the court found that there was ample evidence to conclude
that the defendant was a seller where the alleged third-party supplier denied that he sold the
drugs to the defendant. Id. at 793, 366 N.Y.S.2d at 64.
"I The initial determination to apply the procuring agent theory is a question of law to
be decided by the court. Ultimately, however, whether the defendant was acting as an agent
for a principal is a factual question which must be resolved by the jury. See, e.g., People v.
Roche, 45 N.Y.2d 78, 379 N.E.2d 208, 407 N.Y.S.2d 682 (1978); People v. Lindsey, 12 N.Y.2d
958, 189 N.E.2d 492, 238 N.Y.S.2d 956 (1963) (mem.); People v. Fortes, 24 App. Div. 2d 428,
260 N.Y.S.2d 716 (1st Dep't 1965), appeal dismissed mem., 17 N.Y.2d 583, 215 N.E.2d 519,
268 N.Y.S.2d 341 (1966); People v. Silverman, 23 App. Div. 2d 947, 260 N.Y.S.2d 43 (3d Dep't
1965).
"I See, e.g., People v. Lam Lek Chong, 45 N.Y.2d 64, 379 N.E.2d 200, 407 N.Y.S.2d 674
(1978); People v. Argibay, 45 N.Y.2d 45, 379 N.E.2d 191, 407 N.Y.S.2d 664 (1978) (per
curiam); cases cited in notes 123 & 128 supra.
I" N.Y. PENAL LAW § 115.00 (McKinney 1975).
113 In order to convict a defendant of criminal facilitation, the prosecution must show
that the person who was aided actually committed a felony. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 115.00
(McKinney 1975). Unlike a charge of aiding and abetting, however, it is not necessary to show
that the defendant specifically intended that the underlying crime be committed. See id. §
20.00. Instead, a person may be convicted of facilitation if he believes he is aiding the criminal
plans of another. See, e.g., People v. Feliciano, 40 App. Div. 2d 1021, 388 N.Y.S.2d 993 (2d
Dep't 1972).
During the period when the agency doctrine was recognized by most federal courts as a
defense to a charge of unlawful sale, there was some disagreement concerning the doctrine's
applicability in prosecutions for criminal facilitation. See United States v. Simons, 374 F.2d
993 (7th Cir. 1966), cert denied, 386 U.S. 1025 (1967); Coronado v. United States, 266 F.2d
719 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 851 (1959); United States v. Prince, 264 F.2d 850 (3d
Cir. 1959). In Coronado, the fifth circuit held that the procuring agent theory is not available
in such cases. 266 F.2d at 720. Similarly, in Simons, the seventh circuit stated:
It makes no difference . . . whether the middleman . . . is acting for himself
or for the buyer or the seller. If he makes the sale easier between a seller and a buyer
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ilar to that used in drug sale prosecutions, it would appear that one
who is truly an agent of the purchaser may not be convicted for
facilitating the sale. '34 Such a party is no more than a "facilitator"
of the purchase, and, since the purchase is not a criminal act, it
seems clear that one who makes the purchase cannot possibly be
convicted of facilitating a sale under the penal statute. This argu-
ment would appear to have been reinforced by the Roche court's
conclusion that the "[agency] defense represents a calculated...
judgment not to impose [severe] penalties upon a person who
merely facilitates the acquisition of drugs by a purchaser."' 35
The Procuring Agent Theory: An Alternative to the Entrapment
Defense in Narcotics Sale Prosecutions
The procuring agent defense often is raised in conjunction with
the affirmative defense of entrapment."6 Under the entrapment de-
and does so with scienter, he is guilty of [facilitation]. If, in order to convict a
middleman, it is necessary to prove beyond a reasonable doubt his association with
the seller, it seems to us that the efficacy of the facilitation clause of section 174 is
nullified.
374 F.2d at 995 (emphasis in original). In Prince, however, the third circuit found that the
procuring agent theory is a defense to a charge of facilitation of a criminal sale. 264 F.2d at
853.
,u See, e.g., People v. Volante, 75 Misc. 2d 400, 347 N.Y.S.2d 836 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1973). In Volante, the court found that the defendant had facilitated the transaction by giving
the seller his car so he could obtain drugs for the purchaser. Id. at 403, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 839.
It would appear, however, that the Volante court would have rejected the facilitation charge
if the defendant was truly an agent of the buyer. Id.
'- 45 N.Y.2d at 84, 379 N.E.2d at 212, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 686. The reasoning used by the
Sierra court would seem to suggest that, where large quantities of narcotics are involved, the
agency theory would not be available as a defense to a charge of facilitating possession. See
note 123 supra; People v. Kiser, 63 App. Div. 2d 707, 404 N.Y.S.2d 1005 (2d Dep't 1978),
wherein the court stated that if a defendant knowingly aids a would-be possessor by
"provid[ing him] with the means to commit the crime of criminal possession," a conviction
for criminal facilitation would be proper. Id. at 708, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 1006.
'1' Since many drug sale prosecutions involve transactions initiated by an undercover law
enforcement officer, see note 126 supra, the affirmative defense of entrapment often is raised
as an alternative to the agency defense. See, e.g., United States v. Sawyer, 210 F.2d 169, 170
(3d Cir. 1954); People v. Johnston, 47 App. Div. 2d 897, 366 N.Y.S.2d 198 (2d Dep't 1975).
Theoretically, agency and entrapment are inconsistent defenses, although both involve simi-
lar evidence. The affirmative defense of entrapment is predicated upon the defendant's
admission that he was a seller, but that he was induced to engage in the unlawful transaction
by a law enforcement officer's improper conduct. See, e.g., People v. Johnston, 47 App. Div.
2d 897, 366 N.Y.S.2d 198 (2d Dep't 1975); People v. Fuller, 34 App. Div. 2d 852, 310 N.Y.S.2d
535 (3d Dep't 1970); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 40.05 (McKinney 1975); Park, The Entrapment
Controversy, 60 MINN. L. REV. 163 (1976); Note, The Serpent Beguiled Ale and I Did Eat:
The Constitutional Status of the Entrapment Defense, 74 YALE L.J. 942 (1965). In contrast,
the defendant who invokes the procuring agent theory denies having been a seller in the first
instance, claiming instead that he acted solely on behalf of the purchaser. See, e.g., People
v. Pulliam, 28 App. Div. 2d 786, 281 N.Y.S.2d 137 (3d Dep't 1967). Nevertheless, the New
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fense, an individual who has committed a crime may nevertheless
be exonerated if "the proscribed conduct . . . was induced or en-
couraged" by another.37 Although the theories arise out of similar
factual circumstances, the agency defense appears to have broader
application. While entrapment is available only when the party
soliciting the transaction is a public official,'38 the agency defense
may be used regardless of the identity of the ultimate buyer.'13 A
more significant consideration, however, is the distribution of the
burden of proof under each doctrine. Since entrapment is treated as
an affirmative defense under New York law,'40 the defendant is re-
quired to establish by a fair preponderance of the evidence that he
was persuaded by another to commit the unlawful act.' In contrast,
the procuring agent theory enunciated in Roche is apparently a true
defense, since proof of an agency relationship negates the "sale"
element of the crime.' Thus, once the agency defense is raised, the
prosecution presumably will be required to prove beyond a reason-
able doubt that the accused was not acting as an agent for a
principal-buyer.'
York courts permit a defendant to raise both theories when charged with illegal narcotics sale.
See, e.g., People v. Johnston, 47 App. Div. 2d 897, 366 N.Y.S.2d 198 (2d Dep't 1975); People
v. Felder, 39 App. Div. 2d 373, 334 N.Y.S.2d 992 (2d Dep't 1972), aff'd mem., 32 N.Y.2d 747,
297 N.E.2d 522, 344 N.Y.S.2d 643 (1973); People v. Chambers, 56 Misc. 2d 683, 289 N.Y.S.2d
804 (Sup. Ct. Oneida County 1968); accord, United States v. Sawyer, 210 F.2d 169 (3d Cir.
1954). For a general discussion of the development of agency and entrapment, see Note, A
Procuring Agent May Not Be Convicted of Narcotics Sale, 22 KAN. L. REV. 272 (1974).
I" N.Y. PENAL LAW § 40.05 (McKinney 1975).
Im Id. The entrapment provisions of the penal law represent a legislative policy "to
discourage the use of overzealous methods of law enforcement officials to trap the unwary
innocent into commission of an offense. . . who is not ordinarily disposed to commit it." Id.
commentary at 125.
'" See, e.g., People v. Fortes, 24 App. Div. 2d 428, 260 N.Y.S.2d 716 (1st Dep't 1965),
appeal dismissed mem., 17 N.Y.2d 583, 215 N.E.2d 519, 268 N.Y.S.2d 341 (1966); People v.
Branch, 13 App. Div. 2d 714, 213 N.Y.S.2d 535 (4th Dep't 1961).
W4 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 40.05 (McKinney 1975).
I" Id. § 25.00.
, See People v. Roche, 45 N.Y.2d 78, 86, 379 N.E.2d 208, 213, 407 N.Y.S. 2d 682, 687
(1978) (citing Lewis v. United States, 337 F.2d 541, 543 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1964)).
"I In his dissenting opinion in Roche, Judge Gabrielli expressed particular concern about
the procedural difficulties inherent in the application of the agency defense. 45 N.Y.2d at 93,
379 N.E.2d at 218, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 692 (Gabrielli, J., dissenting in part). Noting that the
procuring agent theory would have to be considered a "true defense" since only the legislature
could create an affirmative defense, Judge Gabrielli pointed out that the prosecution would
have the burden of proving the absence of agency in every case. Id. (Gabrielli, J., dissenting
in part). In view of "the rather murky world of the drug culture," Judge Gabrielli concluded
that such a burden would present an insurmountable obstacle to the prosecution in narcotics
sale cases. Id. (Gabrielli, J., dissenting in part).
While Judge Gabrielli's procedural analysis appears valid, his conclusion is subject to
question. For purposes of determining the appropriate distribution of the respective burdens
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Moreover, it may be significantly easier for the prosecution to
negate an entrapment defense than to rebut an agency defense.
Under New York's penal law, a defendant who invokes entrapment
as a defense must show that he was "active[ly] induce[d] or
encourage[d]" to commit the crime.'44 Generally, if the defendant
was predisposed toward the particular criminal conduct, he cannot
be acquitted.4 5 On the other hand, the existence of criminal predis-
position alone does not appear to be inconsistent with the conten-
tion that the accused was a procuring agent for the buyer.'" Proof
of an inclination to traffic in illicit drugs may be some evidenbe that
the defendant was actually a professional "dealer" who is precluded
from invoking the agency defense under the rationale articulated in
Argibay.'47 The determining factor, however, will be the economic
and social relationships among the parties to the transaction.'"
It thus appears that, as a practical matter, the procuring agent
theory may be a more effective defense to a narcotics sale charge
than is the affirmative defense of entrapment. In light of the differ-
ences in the elements of the two theories, as well as the differences
in the respective burdens of proof, there clearly will be circumstan-
ces in which a defendant who cannot establish an entrapment de-
fense may nevertheless be exonerated under the procuring agent
theory.
of proof, an effective analogy may be drawn between the common-law procuring agent defense
and the statutory defense of insanity. Like the agency defense, the insanity defense must be
disproved by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 25.00 (McKinney
1975). The burden on the prosecution does not arise, however, until the defendant comes
forward with some evidence supporting his contention that he suffered from a legally suffi-
cient mental impairment at the time he committed the crime. 7 J. Zgrr, NEW YoRK CmRMNAL
PRACrICE $ 64.6 (1977). It is submitted that a similar approach may be used in cases where
the facts suggest that the procuring agent theory may become an issue. In such cases, the
defendant should be required to raise the agency defense in the first instance. Once sufficient
facts are alleged, the prosecution would then be required to disprove beyond a reasonable
doubt that a sale, rather than a transfer from agent to principal, took place.
"I N.Y. PENAL LAW § 40.05 (McKinney 1975).
1 See, e.g., People v. Lytle, 38 App. Div. 2d 867, 328 N.Y.S.2d 921 (3d Dep't 1972);
People v. Chambers, 56 Misc. 2d 683, 289 N.Y.S.2d 804 (Sup. Ct. Oneida County 1968).
Evidence of the defendant's former criminal conduct may be introduced to rebut a defense
of entrapment. See People v. Mann, 31 N.Y.2d 253, 288 N.E.2d 595, 336 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1972);
People v. Calvano, 30 N.Y.2d 199, 282 N.E.2d 322, 331 N.Y.S.2d 430 (1972).
"I A defendant who has had previous contact with the narcotics underground is not
precluded as a matter of law from invoking the agency defense. See note 122 and accompany-
ing text supra.
"' See note 83 and accompanying text supra.
'' See notes 75-86 and accompanying text supra.
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CONCLUSION
After decades of silence on the issue, the New York Court of
Appeals has vigorously endorsed the procuring agent doctrine at a
time when most other jurisdictions have discarded it.' The court's
recent reaffirmation of the agency defense has particular signifi-
cance when viewed in light of New York's unusually stringent sys-
tem for punishing narcotics offenders. ,'0 In its 1973 enactment of the
Controlled Substances Offenses law,' 5' the legislature intended to
preserve a flexible system of penalties for minor offenses, 52 while
creating a discretionless system for serious crimes involving narcot-
ics abuse.' 53 In the 5 years since their enactment, these revisions to
the penal law have been criticized as both ineffective'54 and inhu-
"' Although most jurisdictions have discarded the agency defense, the study draft of the
proposed Federal Criminal Code would penalize purchasing agents as "distributors." 2
WORKING PAPERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSSON ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS 1104-
05, quoted in G. UELMEN & V. HADDoX, DRUG ABUSE AND THE LAW 212 n.6 (1974). The Code
creates an offense called "trafficking," which would constitute an A misdemeanor under the
usual circumstances in which the agency defense is applied. PROPOSED FEDERAL CRIMINAL
CODE § 1822(3), quoted in G. UELMEN & Vr HADDOX, DRUG ABUSE AND THE LAW 213 (1974).
It is interesting to note, however, that the agency defense continues to have widespread
recognition in the United States military courts. For a general discussion of the procuring
agent theory and military law, see Dunn, The Agency Defense in Sale of Drug Cases, 16 A.F.
JAG L. REV. 46 (1974); Lamb, The Procuring-Agent Theory as a Defense in Drug Sale
Prosecutions, 27 JAG J. 99 (1972).
'" For an exhaustive analysis of New York's drug laws, see Quinn & McLaughlin, The
Evolution and Present Status of New York Drug Control Legislation, 22 BUFFALO L. REv. 705
(1973).
'' Ch. 276, [19731 N.Y. Laws 1040 (McKinney), amended chs. 277-278, 1051 [1973]
N.Y. Laws 1065, 1075, 3023. The Controlled Substances Offenses provisions were enacted in
response to the then Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller's call for "an effective deterrent to the
pushing of the broad spectrum of hard drugs." N.Y. Gov. Ann. Mess. (1973), reprinted in
[1973] N.Y. Laws 2309, 2318 (McKinney).
"I A significant change in the drug statute was effected in 1977, when the criminal
penalties for possession of small quantities of marihuana were eliminated. Ch. 360, [19771
N.Y. Laws 1 (McKinney). Possession of up to 25 grams of marihuana is now a violation with
a maximum fine of $100 for a first offense. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 221.05 (McKinney Supp. 1978-
1979).
"I See DRUGS AND DRUG PENALTIES UNDER REVIEW: A DOCUMENTARY STUDY - INTERIM
REPORT OF THE TEMPORARY STATE COMMISSION TO EVALUATE THE DRUG LAWS, 1973 N.Y. LEG.
Doc. No. 13, at 70.
M See NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE NATION'S
TOUGHEST DRUG LAW: EVALUATING THE NEW YORK EXPERIENCE - FINAL REPORT OF THE JOINT
COMMIrEE ON NEW YORK DRUG LAW EVALUATION (March 1978); DRUG ABUSE COUNCIL, A
PERSPECTIVE ON "GUT TOUGH" DRUG LAWS (Washington, D.C. 1973). Former Chief Judge
Breitel has observed:
[The] pragmatic value [of these penalties] might well be questioned, since more
than a half century of increasingly severe sanctions has failed to stem, if indeed it
has not caused, a parallel crescendo of drug abuse. The premises upon which the
Legislature has proceeded have been subjected to vigorous dispute. . . . Indeed,
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mane.'55 Many of the critics have been particularly troubled by the
inherent rigidity of the statute,'56 which requires the trial court to
impose extremely harsh sentences upon convicted narcotics offend-
ers.157
It is submitted that the court of appeals' revival of the procur-
ing agent theory represents a judicial attempt to mitigate the harsh
effects of New York's unusual drug law,'5 " which do not, by their
terms, differentiate between the professional drug merchant and
"persons as diverse as impressionable students, victims of contrib-
uting socioeconomic or medical problems, and others who have been
the debate moves beyond the wisdom of substituting long mandatory prison terms
in place of flexible sentencing, of emphasizing isolation and deterrence over rehabil-
itation. Even the questions whether 'the policy of criminalization, which raises the
cost and increases the difficulty of obtaining drugs, does in fact make the drug user
a proselytizer of others in order that he may obtain the funds to acquire his own
drugs,' and whether 'the compulsion of the addict to obtain drugs and the moneys
to purchase them causes him to commit collateral crime that otherwise he might
not commit,' are questions about which reasonable men can and do differ.
People v. Broadie, 37 N.Y.2d 100, 118, 332 N.E.2d 338, 346, 371 N.Y.S.2d 471, 481-82, cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 950 (1975), cited in People v. Roche, 45 N.Y.2d 78, 84 n.2, 379 N.E.2d 208,
212 n.2, 407 N.Y.S.2d 682, 686 n.2 (1978).
" See, e.g., Note, Do the Sentencing Provisions of the New York Drug Laws Constitute
Cruel and Unusual Punishment? - People v. Broadie, 25 DE PAUL L. REv. 103 (1975).
" See, e.g., Winick, Some Aspects of the "Tough" New York State Drug Law, 5 J. DRUG
ISSUES 400-11 (1975), reprinted in NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON DRUG ABUSE, DRUG USERS AND THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 60-61 (1977).
" Article 220 of the New York Penal Law imposes much harsher penalties than those
imposed under prior law. See note 44 supra. Criminal possession under the Dangerous Drug
Offenses ranged from a Class A misdemeanor, ch. 1030, [1965] N.Y. Laws 2343, 2441
(McKinney), punishable by up to 1 year of imprisonment, id. at 2368, to a Class C felony,
id. at 2442, which was punishable by a 1- to 15-year term, id. at 2343. The revised penal law,
provides for degrees of criminal possession that range from an A misdemeanor, N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 220.03 (McKinney Supp. 1978-1979), with a maximum sentence of 1 year, N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 70.15(1) (McKinney 1975), to an A-I felony, N.Y. PENAL LAW § 220.21 (McKinney
Supp. 1978-1979), with a mandatory maximum penalty of life imprisonment. N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 70.00(2)(a) (McKinney 1975). Similarly, the 1967 act prescribed a maximum term of years,
ch. 1030, [1965] N.Y. Laws 2343, 2367 (McKinney), for the lowest degree of criminal sale
classified as a Class D felony, id. at 2442. The highest degree was a Class B felony, id.,
carrying a maximum term of 25 years, id. at 2367. While the lowest degree of criminal sale
under article 220 is still a D felony, N.Y. PENAL LAW § 220.31 (McKinney Supp. 1978-1979),
with a maximum term of 7 years, N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.00(2) (d) (McKinney 1975), the highest
degree constitutes an A-I felony, N.Y. PENAL LAW § 220.43 (McKinney Supp. 1978-1979), with
a mandatory maximum penalty of life imprisonment, N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.00(2)(a) (McKin-
ney 1975).
"I The court of appeals' recent agency defense decisions appear to be consistent with the
legislative purpose of adopting a strict statutory scheme without becoming "so estranged from
the traditions of the Common Law as to abandon its principle that not only should justice
be done, but justice should appear to be done." DRUGS AND DRUG PENALTIES UNDER REVIEW:
A DOCUMENTARY STUDY - INTERIM REPORT OF THE TEMPORARY STATE COMMISSION TO EVALUATE
THE DRUG LAWS, 1973 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 13, at 70.
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seduced by exposure to drugs."' 59 By emphasizing criteria such as
the economic and social relationships among the parties to a drug
transaction, 6 ' the court has ensured that the professional "pusher"
will not benefit from a proper application of the agency doctrine. On
the other hand, by refusing to articulate a series of inflexible rules,
the court has left trial courts and juries free to exonerate defendants
when a conviction for felonious sale and the consequent extended
prison sentence clearly would be an injustice. In the final analysis,
the court has concluded that the question whether a particular de-
fendant was an interested drug merchant or a peripherally involved
agent is one best left to a jury of laymen applying their senses and
everyday experience to the facts before them.
Elaine Robinson McHale
' People v. Roche, 45 N.Y.2d 78, 83, 379 N.E.2d 208, 211, 407 N.Y.S.2d 682, 685 (1978).
' See id. As noted by the dissent in Roche, the four agency defense cases illustrate
"certain potential inconsistencies inherent in so vague a concept." Id. at 92, 379 N.E.2d at
217, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 691 (Gabrielli, J., dissenting in part). It appears, however, that the court
of appeals was aware that the standards articulated were imprecise. Indeed, in his concurring
memorandum, Chief Judge Breitel explicitly acknowledged the need for flexibility when he
stated:
Essentially, the defense is one submitted to the jury for assessment on broad
grounds not susceptible.of meticulous definition. If the defense were susceptible of
meticulous definition it would limit the jury's perspective in determining whether
the defendant was an independently culpable actor . . . [or] an abettor of the
buyer. . . . Worse, it would clutter a court's charge with multifarious "ifs,"
"ands," and "buts," confusing the jury and making likely, tono substantial interest
in achieving justice, error-prone charges by the most conscientious and able of Trial
Justices.
Id. at 87, 379 N.E.2d at 214, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 688 (Breitel, Ch. J., concurring).
